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A DESPERATE GRAB FOR FREE REHAB: UNILATERAL
PLACEMENTS UNDER IDEA FOR STUDENTS WITH DRUG AND
ALCOHOL ADDICTIONS

DavidS. Doty'
"This is your brain (show egg). This is your brain on drugs (show egg
frying in pan)."'
"The term 'child with a disability' means a child-(i) with mental
retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or
language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness),
serious emotional disturbance (hereinafter referred to as 'emotional
disturbance'), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury,
other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who,
by reason thereof, needs special education and related services." 2

I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Ace
[hereinafter IDEA] has been, and continues to be, one of the most active
areas of legal conflict in American public schools. 4 One subset of IDEA
litigation that has experienced explosive growth involves parental
demands for tuition reimbursement for private school placements. The
number of published administrative and judicial tuition reimbursement
decisions "has increased relatively steadily and steeply [from] ... 1978 to
2000." 5
*DavidS. Doty, B.A., Brigham Young U., 1989; A.M., Stanford U., 1990; ).D., Brigham Young U.,
1993; and Ph.D., 1999, Brigham Young U., is an attorney with the Columbia, South Carolina law
firm of Duff, Turner, White & Boykin, L.L.C., which represents public school districts and colleges
throughout South Carolina. In addition to his legal practice, Dr. Doty has taught education law at
the University of Utah, the University of South Carolina, and Winthrop University.
I. Public service television advertisement by the Partnership for a Drug- Free America.
2. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3) (2003).
3. Id.
4. See e.g. Perry A. Zirkel, The "Explosion" in Education Litigation: An Update, 114 Educ. L.
Rep. 34\,348 (1998); Perry A. Zirkel, Tipping the Scales, Am. Sch. Bd. )., Oct. 1997, at 36, 37; What
the Numbers Say About Special Education Litigation, The Spec. Educator, May 27, 1995, at 325, 334335.
5. Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An
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Yet while several scholars have examined the volume, and outcome,
of tuition reimbursement cases, there has been little written about the
"nuts and bolts" of unilateral placement disputes. This paper attempts to
partially fill that gap, and add to the existing literature6 by examining
unilateral placements for drug-abusing and delinquent students,
placements which have the potential to be the source of great
consternation for school districts if aggressive steps are not taken to
prevent and establish proper defenses.
Part II of the paper will provide some background and predictions
regarding private placements for students engaged in drug abuse or
serious delinquency. Part III will review relevant statutes and case law on
the major legal issues connected with such placements, including "child
find" mandates, the definition of "disability," free, appropriate, public
education (FAPE) requirements, appropriateness of private placement,
notice requirements, and equitable considerations. Part IV of the paper
concludes with some recommendations as to how IDEA should be
rewritten by Congress as well as some practical suggestions for school
officials responsible for the delivery of special education.
II. BACKGROUND
One of the most debated areas in special education involves demands
for the payment of tuition costs associated with residential treatment
programs for students with serious emotional or behavioral problems,
particularly those requiring treatment for drug or alcohol addictions.
Over the past few years, school districts across the country have faced
these demands for private residential care. All demands have been
disastrous regardless of the outcome because the district must expend
time, money, and human capital in defense.
Tuition reimbursement demands may become more common for
several reasons. First, although some progress has been made/ drug use
among teenagers remains at unacceptably high levels. According to the
World Health Organization, 41 percent of tenth graders in the United
States have tried marijuana, compared with just 17 percent of tenth
Empirical Analysis, 22 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 350, 355 (Nov./Dec. 2001).

6. See e.g. Cindy L. Skaruppa, Ann Boyer & Oliver Edwards, Tuition Reimbursement for
Parent's Unilateral Placement of Students in Private Institutions: ]ust1jied or Not?, 114 Educ. L. Rep.
353 (1997); Allan G. Osborne, Reimbursement for Unilateral Parental Placements in Unapproved
Private Schools Under IDEA, 90 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (1994); Dixie Snow Huefner, Special Education
Residential Placements for Students with Severe Emotional Disturbances: The Implications of Recent
Ninth Circuit Cases, 67 Educ. L. Rep. 397 (1991).
7. Michael Kranish, More Students Say Schools Drug Free Yet Survey Finds Marijuana Easier
to Get than Beer, Boston Globe A6 (Aug. 21, 2002).
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graders in Europe; and 23 percent of American tenth graders have used
other illicit drugs, compared with just 6 percent of Europeans. 8 Other
recent studies, conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, report that more and more students are using steroids, ecstasy,
and heroin. 9
Second, it is well documented by medical professionals that
adolescents who abuse illicit drugs demonstrate impaired functioning in
school and other settings. 10 In one published study, two scientists
concluded:
Students who use illicit drugs show deficits in school performance,
quality of family relationships, and health and increased psychological
symptoms. Compared with non-users, they are more delinquent and
more actively involved with their peers and live in social environments
in which the perceived use of drugs by other adolescents and parents is
more extensive. Delinquency and extent of perceived drug use
consistently increase with each higher stage of use. 11
Third, an increasing number of teenagers who use drugs are
developing serious addictions, but few who need treatment actually
receive it. According to recent data, approximately "1.1 million children
12-17 years old have problems with drugs and alcohol. Only about
122,000 of them [received] treatment in 2000." 12 Because drug treatment
programs are costly and scarce, often the only students to get treatment
are those whose parents have the financial means to send their children. 13
These factors combined may very well result in more attempts by
parents to use IDEA as a vehicle to obtain funding for residential

8.

U.S. Teens Use Drugs More, Ariz. Republic 6A (Feb. 21, 2001).
Report: Teen Drug Use Unchanged; Smoking Drops, But More Students Are Taking Ecstasy,
Wash. Post A06 (Dec. 15, 2000).
10. Denise B. Kandel & Mark Davies, High School Students Who Use Crack and Other Drugs,
53 Archives Gen. Psych. 71 (Jan. 1996).
9.

II. Id.

12. Donna Leinwand, Youth Need More Drug Programs, Study Shows, USA Today (Feb. 7,
2002) (available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/2002/02/08/usat-treatment.htm>
(accessed Mar. 2, 2004)). See also Quynh-Giang Tran, Study Details Teens' Drug Use, Boston Globe
Al8 (June 14, 2002) (noting that one out of every six teenagers in the Boston area abuses drugs or
alcohol or is so dependent on these substances that in-patient treatment may be required).
13. Leinwand, supra n. 12. See also James Thalman, Only a Fifth of Addicts Treated, Deseret
News (Salt Lake City, Utah) BOI (Aug. 13, 2002) (available at <http://www.desnews.com/
cgibin/ cqcgi_state/ @state.en v?CQ_SESSI ON_KEY =ZCTA URZI QELD&CQ_ CUR_DOCUMENT =I
&CQ_ TEXT_MAIN=YES> (accessed Mar. 2, 2004)) (noting that only 22,000 of 100,000 drug addicts
in Utah receive necessary treatment and that many insurance plans only cover a traditional
approach, involving 30 days of in-patient hospital treatment); All Things Considered, "Profile:
Mother Who is Trying to Get Her Daughter Drug Addiction Treatment," Melissa Block & Michele
Norris, (Nat!. Pub. Radio, Mar. II, 2003) (radio broadcast) (describing one parent's difficult quest to
obtain affordable drug treatment for teenage child).
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treatment programs. When asked to weigh these disputes, hearing
officers and courts must carefully balance the rights of students with
disabilities against the rights and obligations of school officials to make
accurate eligibility determinations and provide appropriate programs for
students in the least restrictive environment.

III. HIGH STAKES PLACEMENTS:

THE LEGAL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH
UNILATERAL RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENTS

Parental demands for tuition reimbursement under IDEA present a
complex array of issues. In order for parents to successfully bring a
claim, they must show the private placement is proper under IDEA, and
that the current individualized education plan (IEP) is inadequate. 14
Parents can challenge the sufficiency of a public placement and its
accompanying IEP by claiming that their child was denied a FAPE
because the State failed to comply with "child find" mandates. 15
However, there are procedural requirements with which parents must
comply in order to be successful. These include giving proper notice of
the intended private placement, 16 objecting to the current IEP, 17 and
timely requesting due process. 18 Parents must also establish that the
student's difficulties are disabilities that fall under IDEA, 19 and that
educational concerns distinct from concerns that do not affect the
educational process motivated the private placement. 20
Public schools, in creating school policy and preparing defenses to
tuition reimbursement demands must be aware of what the law is
concerning these issues. However, the law on many issues is unsettled
because there is either a lack of court precedent or a split among the
courts in the decisions that have been rendered. Nevertheless, knowledge
of the law as it has evolved to date will be useful to legal counselors and
school leaders desiring to minimize liability.

14. Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) [hereinafter
Burlington].
15. 20 U.S.C.A.A. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2003).
16. 34 C.P.R.§ 300.403(d) (2003).
17. Combs v. Sch. Bd. of Rockingham County, 15 P.3d 357,363-364 (4th Cir. 1994).
18. Bernardsville Bd. ofEduc. v. /.H., 42 P.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1994).
19. See 34 C.P.R.§ 300.7(c)(4) (2003); Ellen A. Callegary, The IDEA's Promise Unfulfilled: A
Second Look at Special Education & Related Services for Children with Mental Health Needs After
Garrett F., 5 ). Health CareL. & Policy 164, 184 (2002).
20. Burke County Bd. ofEduc. v. Denton, 895 P.2d 973,980 (4th Cir. 1990).

249]

UNILATERAL PLACEMENTS UNDER IDEA

253

A. The Burlington-Carter Framework

The basic principles governing tuition reimbursement under IDEA
are found in two U.S. Supreme Court cases: School Committee of the
Town of Burlington v. Department of Education 21 and Florence County
School District Four v. Carter. 22 In Burlington, the Court established a
two-pronged test to be used in deciding whether parents are entitled to
tuition reimbursement under IDEA. The test is as follows:
In a case where a court determines that a private placement desired by
the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for
placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond
cavil that 'appropriate' relief would include a prospective injunction
directing the school officials to develop and implement at public
expense an IEP placing the child in a private school. 23
In Carter, the Court reiterated the test: the private placement must be
proper and a public placement inappropriate. 24 The Carter court also
emphasized that parents who "unilaterally change their child's
placement ... without the consent of ... school officials, do so at their
own financial risk," 25 meaning that there is no guarantee of public
reimbursement. Rather, any reimbursement is dependent on judicial
determination. Moreover, Carter held that parents are not automatically
barred from reimbursement if the private school in which they
unilaterally place their child fails to meet state education standards. 26
B. Alleged Denial of FAPE by Failure to Comply with "Child Find"

Many of the reimbursement decisions concerning children with drug
abuse or delinquency problems involve allegations that school officials
failed to evaluate, or identify, in a timely manner, a student's emotional
disturbance [hereinafter ED]. Specifically, districts are often charged
with violating IDEA's "child find" mandate, which provides that states
and school districts must ensure:
All children with disabilities residing in the State, including children
with disabilities attending private schools, regardless of the severity of
their disabilities, and who are in need of special education and related

21. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 359.
22. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 ( 1993) [hereinafter Carter].
23. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
24. Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ("[parents] are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court
concludes both that the public placement violated the IDEA and that the private school placement
was proper under the Act").
25. Id. (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374).
26. Id. at 14.
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services, are identified, located, and evaluated and a practical method is
developed and implemented to determine which children with
disabilities are currently receiving needed special education and related
services. 27
It is not clear from this language whether a school district owes a
specific "child find" duty to each eligible child with a disability, as
opposed to simply a general duty to make the public and parents aware
of the services available in the district. However, most hearing officers
and courts have held that the "child find" duty does run to individual
children, finding that "(t]he individual right to a free appropriate public
education for a child who is classified for special education purposes is
meaningless if the child has no comparable right to demand
classification. " 28
Despite the fact that the "child find" obligation is an affirmative duty,
it is "in no way absolute." 29 School officials must at least have reasonable
knowledge of the disability, which "may be inferred from written
parental concern, the behavior or performance of the child, teacher
concern, or a parental request for an evaluation." 30
Unfortunately, in the absence of a specific request or referral for
evaluation, it is not clear how much evidence of disability school officials
must observe before the duties to evaluate and classify are brought into
effect. One frequently cited case in this area, Clay T. v. Walton County
School District, 31 stands for the proposition that school officials do not
violate the "child find" mandate unless they overlook "clear signs" 32 of
disability and offer no rational justification for deciding not to evaluate.
In Clay T., the decrease in the student's marks seemed more clearly
linked to the student's choices, such as not turning in assignments, than
to the student's impairment, i.e., his alleged chemical imbalance. 33 A
somewhat higher standard was recently articulated by a federal court in
Hawaii, which stated that the duty "'is triggered when the [school] has
reason to suspect a disability, and reason to suspect that special education

27. 20 U.S.C.A.A. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
28. Davis County Sch. Dist., I 02 LRP 4246 (Utah 1998) [hereinafter Davis County] (citing Clay
T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ga. 1997) [hereinafter Clay T.]. See also
Robertson County Sch. Sys. v. King, 99 F.3d 1139 (6th Cir. 1996); Round Rock Indep. Sch. Dist., 25
IDELR 336 (Tex. 1996) [hereinafter Round Rock]; Eagle Point Sch. Dist., 18 IDELR 1268 (Or. 1992).
29. Wiesen berg v. Bd. ofEduc. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311 (D. Utah
2002).
30. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(8)(B)(i-iv) (2003)).
31. Clay T., 952 F. Supp. at 817.
32. !d. at 823.
33. Clay T., 952 F. Supp. at 823. The student was eventually diagnosed with ADD and treated
with medication. !d. at 820.
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services may be needed to address that disability."' 34 Regardless of the
confusion over the quantum of knowledge required, it is probably safe to
say that the "child find" duty is not triggered simply by noticing that a
child has a physical or mental impairment: school officials must be put
on notice that a child has a disability as defined by IDEA. Furthermore,
there must be evidence that the disability is causing an adverse effect on
the child's education in order for the "child find" duty to arise.
School officials should thus be aware of this threshold issue,
particularly if a unilateral placement dispute ends up in litigation. If
there is no evidence of a child's disability, the school cannot be liable for
violating the "child find" mandate. Several districts have successfully
defeated reimbursement demands on grounds that school officials had
no prior notice of either the student's impairment or its adverse effect on
the student's school performance. 35
On the other hand, school officials who ignore evidence of disability
as it relates to poor school performance do so at their periP 6

34. Dept. of Educ., St. of Haw. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001)
(internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Cari Rae S.).
35. See e.g. Katherine S. v. Umbach, No. Civ. A. 00- T-982-E, 2002 WL 226697 (M.D. Ala.
2002) (denying reimbursement for tuition at the Elan School in Maine because school officials had
no reason to suspect that the student needed special education, because despite diagnoses of ODD,
ADHD, asthma, depression, and conflict with parents, student was "vivacious" and academically
successful); f.S. v. Shoreline Sch. Dist., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2002) [hereinafter f. S.)
(denying reimbursement where school officials, who were serving student under an IEP for ADD,
were not informed by parents or child's physicians of child's home behavior problems, which
included marijuana use, threatening parents, and theft); Hoffman v. E. Troy Community Sch. Dist., 38
r. Supp. 2d at 750 (E.D. Wis. 1999) [hereinafter Hoffman] (teachers' observations that student fell
asleep in class, had poor classroom performance, and failed one class did not give rise to suspicion
that student was emotionally disturbed); Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 102 LRP 19074 (Md. 2002)
(denying reimbursement because while school officials knew student had been hospitalized prior to
withdrawal from district and enrollment in residential placement, they did not know the nature of
the psychotic episode or have any information that the student was depressed or had ADD); W.
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR 275 (Pa. 2000) [hereinafter W. Chester) (school officials had no
reason to suspect that student with depression and behavior problems at home was disabled simply
because her grades fluctuated and declined); Davis County, 102 LRP 4246 (district did not have child
find duty regarding a student who, despite parental conflict and drug use outside of school, appeared
emotionally stable and academically successful in the classroom).
36. See e.g. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (ordering tuition reimbursement as the result
of "child find" violation where school officials ignored student's dramatically declining grades and
escalating disciplinary problems); Round Rock, 25 IDELR 336 (ordering partial reimbursement on
grounds that district should have evaluated student, who exhibited various behavioral problems,
including defiance of parents, truancy, car theft, running away from home, and substance abuse, to
determine whether student met the criteria for serious emotional disturbance in addition to being
socially maladjusted); Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. No. 414, 257 IDELR 611 (OCR 1985) [hereinafter Lake
Wash.) (finding that district's blanket policy of refusing evaluations for alcohol and drug addicted
students was discriminatory, because even though substance abuse does not qualify students for
special education under IDEA, such students still may have disabilities under Section 504).
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C. Defending the IEP

If a student with drug abuse or delinquency problems has not been
classified as a student with a disability before his parents unilaterally
place him in a residential setting, virtually the only way the parents can
meet the second prong of the Burlington test (showing that the district
denied FAPE) is to prove a "child find" violation. However, it sometimes
occurs that a student who has been previously identified with a disability
is suddenly removed from the school system and placed unilaterally by
his parents in a residential facility. In that case, school officials must be
prepared on both procedural and substantive grounds to defend the IEP
as it existed at the time of the student's exit from the district.

1. Procedural Defense #1: Parental Failure to Provide 10-Day Prior
Written Notice
Procedurally, school officials can assert that reimbursement should
be denied if the parents suddenly, and without prior notice, withdrew
their child from the district without objecting to the IEP. IDEA
regulations explain:
(d) Limitation on reimbursement. The cost of reimbursement [for
private school placement] ... may be reduced or denied(l)If-

(i)At the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended
prior to the removal of the child from the public school, the
parents did not inform the IEP team that they were rejecting
the placement proposed by the public agency to provide FAPE
to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent
to enroll their child in a private school at public expense; or
(ii)At least ten (10) business days (including any holidays that
occur on a business day) prior to the removal of the child from
the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the
public agency of the information described in paragraph
(d)(l)(i) of this section. 37

Courts have held that this provision applies only where the student
has previously been deemed eligible for special education and an IEP
proposed or implemented. 38 Moreover, the plain language of this

37. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(d).
38. See Sandler v. Hickey, 246 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2001) (Maryland equivalent of federal prior
notice requirement did not apply where no IEP had been proposed before parents enrolled child in
the Grove School).
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regulation clearly does not require a denial of reimbursement if parents
fail to provide proper prior notice of their objections to the IEP and
intentions to place their child in a private school at public expense; it
states only that the cost of reimbursement "may be reduced or denied" 39
as the result of the parents' lack of communication. Nevertheless, at least
one hearing officer has ruled that similar notice provisions under
Maryland law are mandatory where an IEP is in dispute, and concluded
that "the Parents' failure to comply with those requirements cripples any
claim to reimbursement, regardless of whether the proposed placement
provided FAPE or not." 40
Indeed, even when denying reimbursement on this basis is viewed as
discretionary, most courts and hearing officers have ruled in favor of
schools, dismissing or reducing reimbursement claims where parents fail
to give timely notice of their intentions. 41
2. Procedural Defense #2: Parents' Failure to Object to IEP Prior to
Unilateral Placement

In addition, a number of courts, while not relying on the ten-day
notice requirements in IDEA 1997, have nonetheless dismissed
39. 34 C.P.R. 300.403(d).
40. Prince George's Country Pub. Sch., 28 IDELR 680, 684 (Md. 1998).
41. See e.g. Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying
reimbursement because parents arranged to enroll student at private school before requesting due
process hearing or advising the district of their specific objections and intent to remove their child
from public school); Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Rafferty] (upholding denial of tuition reimbursement where parent failed to provide school district
required notice at least ten business days prior to removing the child from public school); M.C. v.
Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that child was barred from
reimbursement for the costs of his psychological treatment, where child's parents failed to raise any
issue with respect to the psychological services provided in the IEPs until after the treatment had
ended); Pollowitz v. Weast, 34 IDELR 171 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding dismissal of tuition
reimbursement claims where parents' letter to school officials merely informed the district of the
student's private placement without indicating that the proposed IEP was unsuitable); james v. Upper
Arlington City Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that parents could not recover private
school tuition expenses retroactively between the initial removal of child from district and date they
subsequently sought IEP, although they could pursue reimbursement claim for tuition costs after
date that IEP was sought); Nein v. Greater Clark County Sch. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (reducing by one half the reimbursement originally ordered where parents failed to comply
with prior notice requirements); Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 2003 WL 21180814 (D. Me. May 20,
2003) (upholding dismissal of tuition reimbursement claim where parent did not comply with IDEA
notice requirements); Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 139 (Pa. 2000) (denying reimbursement
because parents engaged in "unfair gamesmanship," removing the child from school without notice
several months after agreeing to an IEP that "provided every detail they demanded," and then
"delaying the scheduled hearing for the remainder of the school year without any overriding
justification."); Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 22 (Pa. 2000) (rejecting reimbursement claim
because parents failed to provide timely written notice, including their specific concerns, ten
business days before enrolling their child in a private school).
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reimbursement claims because of the parents' failure to object to the IEP
and provide school officials with an opportunity to remedy concerns
prior to unilaterally placing a child in a private setting. The general
principle here is that "[s]chool boards must be given adequate notice of
problems if they are to remedy them, and must be given sufficient time to
respond to those problems before they can be held liable for failure to
act."42

3. Procedural Defense #3: Parents' Delay in Requesting Due Process
A third procedural defense school officials may need to consider is
laches, that is, the prejudicial effect of the parents' delay in pursuing due
process against the district. A distinct body of case law has begun to
emerge holding that parents are not entitled to an IDEA remedy when
they wait long periods of time before seeking tuition reimbursement in
due process proceedings. Courts reaching this conclusion have relied on
the following reasoning:
[M]ere notice of parental "dissatisfaction" does not alone put the Board
on reasonable notice that the parents will challenge a particular IEP in
the future and seek reimbursement for an interim unilateral placement
in a private institution. Absent initiation of review proceedings within
a reasonable time of a unilateral decision to transfer a child to a private

42. Combs, 15 F.3d at 363-364. See also Wise v. Ohio Dept. of Educ., 80 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that parents were not entitled to reimbursement because they unilaterally changed
their child's educational placement without ever making a formal complaint to the district or asking
the district to place their child in a residential care facility); Evans v. Dist. No. 17 of Douglas County,
841 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that parent was not entitled to reimbursement where she
expressed concerns about child's public school placement but never formally or informally asked
district to make a change of placement; "school officials were never given the opportunity to make
(or refuse to make) changes because the parents unilaterally removed their child from the school
district."); Mary P. v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 934 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denying parents
reimbursement between April 1991, when they were denied services, and january 1992, when they
first registered dissatisfaction with the district); Bd. of Educ. of Avon Lake City Sch. Dist., 9 F. Supp.
2d 811 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (denying $71,000 reimbursement claim for tuition at Elan School in Maine
because parents "failed or neglected to take appropriate action to express their dissatisfaction with
the District's programs or to inform the District that they were withdrawing [student] from
school."); Alexander K. v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 30 IDELR 967 (E.D. Va. 1999) (denying reimbursement
where parents chose to withdraw the student rather than expressing their disagreement in a renewed
IEP or requesting an administrative review or hearing at the time); In re Student with a Disability, 30
IDELR 97 (Del. 1999) (dismissing reimbursement claims because parent provided no notice of
disagreement with student's 8th grade educational placement or his proposed high school placement
prior to withdrawing student and enrolling him in private school); Round Rock, 25 IDELR 336
(holding that parents waived right to reimbursement between the spring of 1994, when they signed
student out, without notice to the district that they wanted a different program, and january 1995,
when they informed the district they wanted reimbursement for residential treatment program);
Lake Wash., 257 IDELR 611 (finding that district was not required to fund an out-of-district
placement that the parents selected unilaterally, without consultation with the district).
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institution, a school district would not know to continue to review and
revise an IEP, and the court would be left to hazard conjecture or
hypothesis as to what the Board of Education might have proposed if it
had been informed of the parents' continued intent to pursue an
appropriate education for their child within the school district. We, of
course, recognize that the school district has the duty in the first
instance to provide an appropriate IEP, and moreover, to demonstrate
by a preponderance at a due process hearing that the IEP it offered was
indeed appropriate. With that foremost in mind, we must nevertheless
also recognize that as a practical reality, and as a matter of procedural
law, ... the right of review contains a corresponding parental duty to
unequivocally place in issue the appropriateness of an IEP. This is
accomplished through the initiation of review proceedings within a
reasonable time of the unilateral placement for which reimbursement is
sought. We think more than two years, indeed, more than one year,
without mitigating excuse, is an unreasonable delay. 43

4. Substantive Defenses: Proving the Appropriateness of the IEP
Of course, whether or not school officials can rely on procedural
defenses, they will almost certainly have to prove the appropriateness of
the IEP in order to prevail in a tuition reimbursement case. Two points
bear emphasizing here.
First, "the measure and adequacy of an IEP can only be determined
as of the time it is offered to the student, and not at some later date ....
Neither the statute nor reason countenance 'Monday Morning
Quarterbacking' in evaluating the appropriateness of a child's
placement." 44
In other words, "(a]n IEP is a snapshot, not a

43. Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 158. See also Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190
!'.3d 80 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that parents could not recover "tuition reimbursement for the period
preceding the parents' request for a due process hearing."); Phillips v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick
Hudson Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the equitable doctrine of laches
barred parents from reimbursement for the first three years of child's private placement where
parents did not file a due process complaint until five years after the private placement); L.K. v. Bd. of
Educ. for Transylvania County, 113 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D.N.C. 2000) [hereinafter L.K.] (denying
reimbursement where parent did not initiate due process hearing until more than two years after
unilaterally placing child in private school); Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wilks, 657 F. Supp. 1163
(N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that parent was not entitled to reimbursement for expenses of residential
placement incurred prior to her challenge of child's IEP); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City
of N.Y., 29 JDELR 143 (N.Y. 1998) (denying tuition reimbursement for the 1996-97 school year
where parent waited over 15 months between unilateral placement and her request for due process);
White v. Sch. Bd. of Henrico County, 549 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that where parent
signed and consented to IEP, her objection to its implementation one year later was untimely, and
warranted denial of reimbursement).
44. Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 534 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135
(1996).
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retrospective." 45 Therefore, a student's IEP must be evaluated in the
context of the student's needs, as well as the district's knowledge of those
needs, at the time the IEP was developed.
Second, the IEP must have some meaningful effect-some benefiton the student's educational progress. The "some benefit" standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Rowle/6 has been interpreted by the
lower federal courts to mean that the IEP must confer more than a trivial
educational benefit. 17 Courts have consistently held that an IEP does not
meet the substantive requirement of FAPE unless it confers a
"meaningful educational benefit."4 H
It is also important to note that IEPs do not have to articulate every
minute detail of a child's program in order to be legally sufficient. The
Tenth Circuit has observed that "there is no legal authority requiring a
particular level of specificity in the statement of annual goals," and that
"IEPs are not required to provide the level of detail found in monthly
instructional plans." 49 In fact, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that an IEP
meets the Rowley FAPE mandate as long as it meets a four-pronged test:
"(l) the program is individualized on the basis of the student's
assessment and performance; (2) the program is administered in the least
restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a coordinated
and collaborative manner by the key 'stakeholders;' and (4) positive
academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated." 50

D. Is the Private Placement Proper Under the Act?
Under Burlington-Carter, parents seeking tuition reimbursement
must do more than show that the district denied FAPE to their child.
They must also show that the private placement they unilaterally selected
was proper under the Act. This prong of the analysis becomes critical in
cases involving students with drug and delinquency problems because
the evidence often demonstrates that a residential program was pursued
for reasons completely unconnected to education.

45. Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983,992 (1st Cir. 1990), ccrt. denied, 499 U.S.
912 (1991).

Bd. o(Educ. of Hendrick Hudson C. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-204 ( 19H2).
Hail v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774l-'.2d 629,635 (4th Cir. 19X5).
4X. M.A. v. Voorhees Township Bd. of Educ., 202 F. Supp. 2d 345, 361 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing
i'olk v. C. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16,853 F2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 4XX U.S.
·!6.
47.

1030 ( 1989)).

O'Toole v. Olathe Unijied Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692,706 (lOth Cir. 1998).
Houston hzdep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 347-48 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Cypress-Fairbanks lndcp. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied. 522
49.

50.

U.S 11H7 (1998)).

249]

UNILATERAL PLACEMENTS UNDER IDEA

261

I. Emotional Disturbance v. Conduct Disorder: A Split in the Circuits

Closely intertwined with the "child find" issue is the issue of whether
a student has a disability that warrants residential placement. In many of
the cases involving drug addicted students, parents allege that their
children meet the criteria for serious emotional disturbance, which are
set forth in IDEA's regulations. They are as follows:
(i) The term [emotional disturbance] means a condition exhibiting one
or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and
to a marked degree that adversely affects a child's educational
performance:

(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory, or health factors.
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal
relationships with peers and teachers.
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal
circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated
with personal or school problems.
(ii)The term includes schizophrenia. The term does not apply to
children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they
have an emotional disturbance. 5 1
Unfortunately, neither IDEA nor its regulations provide an
operational definition for the terms "adverse effect" or "social
maladjustment." Therefore, it is not uncommon, particularly with
children exhibiting "bad behavior," to have disagreement among parents
and professionals, with the result often being litigation. As one author
has noted:
If the disagreement cannot be worked out through the IEP Team
process, then courts are the final arbiters of whether the child receives
special education and related services in the school setting. The clashes
often arise when these two different sets of professionals [educators and
mental health professionals], who use completely different sets of
vocabularies, attempt to mesh their frameworks together to understand
the child and his or her needs. 52

51. 34 C.FR. § 300.7(c)(4) (emphasis added).
52. Callegary, supra n. 19, at 1R4.
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Yet even the courts cannot agree on what the terms from IDEA
mean. On the one hand, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a narrow
definition of ED, concluding that where students persist in unruly
behavior outside societal norms, such as substance abuse and
delinquency, they are most appropriately labeled "socially maladjusted"
rather than ED. In Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 53 the court
reasoned:
[A] "bad conduct" definition of serious emotional disturbance might
include almost as many people in special education as it excluded. Any
definition that equated simple bad behavior with serious emotional
disturbance would exponentially enlarge the burden IDEA places on
state and local education authorities. 54

Indeed, the weight of both court and administrative authority lines
up with Springer, particularly where the student's difficulties occur
primarily, or solely, outside of schooJ.5 5
On the other hand, courts in the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
have adopted broader definitions of "emotional disturbance," effectively
53. Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 !'.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998).
54. Jd. at 664.
55. Sec e.g. A.E. v. Indep. Sell. Dist. No. 25,936 F.2d 472 (lOth Cir. 1991) (holding that student
engaging in theft, fighting, tardiness, smoking, use of improper language, and suicidal gestures was
not ED, but rather socially maladjusted); Katherine S. v. Umbach, 2002 WL 226697 (M.D. Ala. 2002)
(student in contlict with parents not ED); B/ickle v. St. Charles Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 20
IDELR 167, 179 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("A school cannot be held responsible for all psychiatric or other
medical problems (including substance abuse), particularly when these problems manifest
themselves beyond the parameters of a regular school day and do not directly bear on a child's
instructional needs."); Hcif.lman, 3X 1'. Supp. 2d at 767 (llnding that student who was sleeping in class,
fighting with his parents, and seeing a therapist for depression was not ED, and noting that the basic
standard f()r ED is "commonsensical: an ED child's behavioral problems must bc unusually serious
as compared to the majority of his pccrs and must present a significant impediment to learning.");
Bonita Unified Scl1. Dist., 32 IDELR 273 (Cal. 2000) (student with severe behavior problems at home
not ED); Capistrarw Unified Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 199 (Cal. 1999) (marijuana-using student with
diagnosis of depression not eligible for special education under OHI category); Williams Unified Sclz.
Dist., 26 IDELR II'JX (Cal. 1997) (drug abusing student not ED); Mt. Diablo Unified Sclz. Dist., 26
IDELR 338 (Cal. 1997) (holding that student was not ED where student's school di!Ticulties were
caused by other factors, including substance abuse, lack of effort, and failure to attend class); In Rc
TL., 26 IDELR 1374 (Ill. 1997) (drug and alcohol abusing student not ED); Bd. of Educ. of Midland
Pub. Sch., 25 IDELR 669 (Mich. 1996) (student who engaged in serious alcohol and drug use, got
himself tattooed, pierced his ears and nose, mistreated his dog, threatened his sisters, extorted lunch
money from younger students, engaged in group sex, and broke windows not ED); DeSoto County
Sdz. Dist., 102 LRP 3846 (Miss.) (drug abusing student not ED); W. Chester, 32 lDELR 275 (drug
abusing student not ED); Radnor Township Sch. Dist., 25 JDELR 1229 (Pa. 1997) (student with long
history of serious drug abuse, manipulative behaviors, theft, lying, and defiance with parents not
ED); Pflugerville Indcp. Sclz. Dist., 21 IDELR 308 (Tex. 1994) (student whose behavioral problems
were attributable to his family life and drug abuse not ED); Davis County, 102 l.RP 4246 (student
who was defiant with parents and abusing drugs and alcohol not ED); Fauquier County Pub. Sch., 20
IDELR 579 (Va. 1993) (student who exhibited behavioral problems outside of school not ED because
her condition did not adversely affect her educational performance).
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blurring the lines between a student's behavior inside and outside of
school. For example, in Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., 56 the
Eighth Circuit noted that it believed it "unlikely that Congress meant for
IDEA to require states to provide a home away from home for students
who simply make bad choices, even if those choices cause them to fail in
school." 57 At the same time, the court reasoned that simply because most
of the student's behavior problems, including drug abuse, sexual
promiscuity, running away from home, and check forging, occurred
outside of school, that did not mean residential placement was
unnecessary. The court explained:
If the problem prevents a disabled child from recelVlng educational
benefit, then it should not matter that the problem is not cognitive in
nature or that it causes the child even more trouble outside the
classroom th.m within it. What should control our decision is not
whether the problem itself is 'educational' or 'non-educational,' but
whether it needs to be addressed in order for the child to learn. 5H

2. Private Placements for Reasons Separate and Apart from the Learning
Process
Closely connected with the issue of eligibility is the issue of motive
for the private placement. In the Fourth Circuit, the burden rests on the
parents to show that the private placement they select is a proper
placement "for their [child's] special educational needs." 5 ~ Further, the
Fourth Circuit's position is that residential care is mandated only if it is
"essential for the child to make any educational progress at all." 60
Otherwise, "[i]f residential placement is necessitated by medical, social,
or emotional problems that are segregable from the learning process,

56. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A. C., 258 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 775.
58. Id. at 777. See also County of San Diego v. Cal. Spec. Educ. Hearing Off, 93 F. 3d 1458,
1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (in determining whether a child's impairment has an adverse effect on
educational performance, courts must consider that "educational benefit l under IDEA] is not limited
to academic needs but includes social and emotional needs that affect academic progress, school
behavior, and socialization."); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the term "unique educational needs" shall be broadly construed to include the
disabled child's academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical and vocational needs);
Venus lndep. Sch. Dist. v. DanielS., 2002 WL 550455 page 10 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that student
was OHI and ED because, even though student's academic pert(Jrmance was well above average, his
behavioral problems, which resulted in over 20 suspensions, had an adverse effect on his overall
educational performance; "a true measure of a child's educational perf(>rmance is not strictly limited
to an evaluation of his performance in academics.").
59. Tice v. Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1208 n.11 (4th C:ir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
60. Burke, 895 F.2d at 980.
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then the local education agency need not fund the residential
placement." 61
Thus, numerous courts and hearing officers have denied
reimbursement where the placement was made for reasons unrelated to
education. For example, parents are not entitled to reimbursement
where the child is placed in a residential setting for medical or psychiatric
treatment. 62
Likewise, parents have not been successful with reimbursement
demands where they unilaterally placed their children in residential
programs for treatment necessitated by family conflict, drug abuse, or
delinquent behavior. 63

E. Equitable Considerations
Finally, school officials should remember arguments of basic fairness
in reimbursement cases. 64
IDEA regulations stipulate that
reimbursement may be denied upon
a judicial finding of
unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by the parents," 65 and
hearing officers and courts "look harshly upon any party's failure to
reasonably cooperate with another's diligent execution of their rights and

61. ld. See also Tenn. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466,
1471 (6th Cir. 1996).
62. See e.g. Butler v. Evans, 225 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2000); Gladstone Sch. Dist. v. A.M., 25
IDELR 131 (9th Cir. 1996); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Off of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th
Cir. 1990); Daugherty v. Hamilton County Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Tenn. 1998); San juan
Unified Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 47 (Cal. 1997); U. of Iowa Hasp. & Clinics, 34 IDELR 169 (Iowa 2001);
Trcdyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 254 (Pa. 2000); Round Rock, 25 IDELR 336; McKenzie v.
jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983).
63. See e.g. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County v. Brett Y., 155 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1998)
(student placed in a private program, the Grove School, for significant behavior problems at home);
Dale M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bradley Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 237 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2001)
(student involved with drug abuse and juvenile delinquency); Armstrong v. Alicante Sch., 44 F. Supp.
2d 1087 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that drug prevention or intervention are not supportive services
required by IDEA); Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Ill. St. Bd. of
Educ., 21 I'. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (student placed in psychiatric facility for "out-of-control"
behavior, including running away, drug abuse, and defiance of home rules); Field v. Haddonfield Bd.
of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 1313 (D.N.j. 1991) (parents were responsible for the cost of student's
enrollment in private drug treatment program); Indian River County Sch. Bd., 36 IDELR 47 (Fla.
2002) (student engaged in drug abuse and sexual promiscuity); Pleasant Valley Community Sch.
Dist., 28 IDELR 1295 (Iowa 1998) (students' private psychotherapy prompted by home issues,
including threats against her parents); Brian M. v. Boston Pub. Sch., 401 IDELR 341 (Mass. 1989)
(ED student who abused drugs and alcohol); W. Linn- Wilsonville Sch. Dist., 102 LRP 2443 (Or. 2000)
(student drug abuser who engaged in uncontrollable anger and destruction of objects at home).
64. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374 ("equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning
relief').
65. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(d)(3).
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obligations under the IDEA." 66
Thus, schools can defeat reimbursement claims if parents have,
among other things, negotiated in bad faith, concealed information, or
refused to make their child available to school officials for evaluation. 1' 7
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

As Congress contemplates reauthorization of IDEA, Congress needs
to rewrite some of the provisions on emotional disturbance and
unilateral placements in order to eliminate the controversy surrounding
residential placements for students with addictions. For example,
Congress should provide a more narrow definition of ED, with an
accompanying definition of "social maladjustment, to make it clear that a
student's voluntary, irresponsible behavior does not equate with
involuntary or uncontrollable poor behavior." In addition, given school
districts' tight budgets and the failure of Congress to provide full funding
of IDEA, Congress should revise the parental notice provisions so that
parents' failure to comply would result in an automatic, rather than a
discretionary, denial of reimbursement.
In the meantime, school officials can still reduce their potential
exposure for tuition reimbursement claims by taking a number of steps,
including the following five suggestions.
A. 10-Day Prior Notice
Ensure that all parents and staff are aware of the 10-day prior notice
requirement with respect to removing a child from public school and
66. Patricia P. v. Rd. o(Educ. of Oak Park, 203 f.3d 462,469 (7th Cir. 2000). Sec also W.G. v.
Ed. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The conduct
of both parties must be reviewed to determine whether relief is appropriate").
67. See e.g Schoenfeld v. Parkway Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. l99S) (denying
reimbursement where parents enrolled child in private school without conferring with school
officials or providing them with opportunity to evaluate and t(Jrmtdate a plan); Glendale Unified Sch.
J)ist. v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (reducing reimbursement award where parent
withheld inl(mnation from school officials which impaired their ability to make decisions about the
child's program); l .. K., 113 f. Supp. 2d at 856 (denying reimbursement where parent unilaterally
withdrew child without providing district opportunity to evaluate his needs); /.5., 220 F. Supp. 2d at
1175 (rejecting parents' claim of "child find" violation, and tuition reimbursement claim, where
parents "actively concealed" child's home behavioral problems until his eighth grade year, and "even
then muted the seriousness and extent of the episodes"); Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 31 1DFLR
223 (Md. 2000) (parents continually delayed proposed meeting times and refused to submit
inl(mnation; parents "appeared more interested in the district as a funding source rather than as an
educational source."); Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 24 IDELR 400 (Md. 1996) (parents denied
reimbu"'ement t(Jr refusal to cooperate with the district in evaluating the child); N. Y.C. Ed. o(Educ.,
FI-ll.R 50R:ll9 (N.Y. 19S6) (parents failed to cooperate in good faith with the district by refusing to
make inf(Hmation available and refusing to attend lEI' meeting).
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placing him or her in a residential setting. Even if they did not comply
with the notice requirement, parents can still recover if they can prove
they did not receive notice of the notice requirement. 6 x
B. Full Disclosure

Upon learning that parents are withdrawing their child and pursuing
a private residential program, insist on full disclosure of all information
and request parents' consent for further evaluation, particularly if there is
any concern at all that behavioral, emotional, and/or medical problems
outside of school have adversely affected the child's behavior or academic
performance at school. Schools have the right, under the IDEA, to
evaluate students with their own personnel, even in the face of allegations
that further evaluations might result in medical or psychological harm to
the student. 69
C. Good Faith and Willingness to Work

Demonstrate good faith and a willingness to work with the parents
toward a return of the student to public school. This approach should
include, for students who still have more than one year of school left after
withdrawal, inviting the parents to an IEP meeting to develop a new IEP
for the ensuing school year, although it is not clear whether school
officials are legally obligated to do so. 70

68. 34 C.P.R.§ 300.403(e)(4).
69. See e.g. Andress v. Cleveland Indep. Sch. Dist., 64 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1995); Chester Sch.
Dist., 23 IDELR 588 (N.H. 1995) (ordering an evaluation of student with seizures where parents had
failed to produce "sufficient medical information to substantiate that comprehensive evaluations
have been conducted, ruling out all potential diagnoses").
70. The regulations state only that each public agency must ensure that "an IEP is developed
and implemented for each eligible child placed in or referred to a private school or facility by the
public agency." 34 C.P.R.§ 300.341(a)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). See also Amann v. Stow Sch. Sys.,
982 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1992); MM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2002); Carl
D. v. Spec. Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (E. D. Mo. 1998); ].S., 220 F. Supp. 2d at
1175; Questions and Answers on Obligations of Public Agencies in Serving Children with Disabilities
Placed by Their Parents at Private Schools, OSEP Memo. 00-14 (May 4, 2000) (all holding that IDEA
does not impose a continuing duty upon school districts to develop and implement IEPs for students
unilaterally placed in private school by their parents). But see Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238
F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 20(ll); Redding Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Goyne, 34 IDELR 118 (E.D. Cal. 20(ll);
Justin G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 148 F. Supp. 2d 576 (D. Md. 20(l!); Upland Unified
Sch. Dist., 102 LRP 7623 (Cal. 2000); Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2, 24 !DELR 357 (Idaho
1996) (all holding that school officials have an ongoing duty to annually update a student's IEP and
to provide FAPE once they are on notice that a student has been unilaterally placed by his parents in
a private school).
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D. Private Placement Programs and Services

Carefully scrutinize the program and services delivered to the child
in the private placement. Many of the residential treatment programs in
which drug abusing students enroll are nothing more than behavior
modification programs, which are inappropriate under the Act for a
number of reasons, including the fact that they may not deliver any
educational services, much less an individualized program, and may,
because of their restrictive nature, violate IDEA's least restrictive
environment (LRE) mandate. 71
Where parents seek reimbursement for placements at wilderness
programs or "boot camps" located in remote parts of the United States or
foreign countries, schools should be particularly thorough with their
investigation. Some of these so-called behavior modification programs
are unlicensed, provide very little in the way of formal education, and
have come under recent scrutiny for alleged physical abuse and other
misconduct, including immigration and licensure violations. 72
71. Sec e.g. Rafferty, 315 F.3d at 21 (holding that private placement was not appropriate
because, while child spent four to five hours per day working on reading alone with a tutor, she did
not study any other subjects, such as social studies, math, English, or science); M.S. on behalf of S.S.
v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Yonkers, 231 F.3d 96 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that private
placement at Stephen Gaynor Schools was inappropriate because of its restrictive nature); Linda W.
v. Ind. Dept. of Educ., 200 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999) (denying reimbursement, in part, because IDEA
"prefers a 'mainslrearning' approach, while Landmark's program separates its pupils from their nondisabled peers."); Indep. Sch. Dis!. No. 283 v. S.D., 984 f. Supp. 860 (D. Minn. 1995) (noting that
"segregation for segregation's sake is anathema under the IDEA," and therefore holding that
student's placement at Groves Learning Center, a private school, was not proper, "particularly with
its wholly segregated class structure."); Reese v. Bd. of Educ. of Bismarck R- V Sch. Dist., 225 F. Supp.
2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2002) ("The overwhelming evidence showed that Edgewood [private placement]
was clearly a more restrictive placement than necessary, failed to provide Spencer with the
opportunity to interact with nondisabled peers and benefit from exposure to positive behaviors,
emphasized improvement in social skills over academic progress, and removed Spencer from his
horne, family, and friends which bolstered Spencer's separation anxiety and manifested itself in an
increase of aggressive and violent behavior by Spencer."); ].B. and M.B. on behalf of E.B. v. Bd. of
Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 2001 WL 546963 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (finding that private
placement at York Prep was not appropriate because student did not receive special education there);
Sylvie M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Dripping Springs Indep. Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 681 (W.D. Tex. 1999),
affd, 214 F.3d 1351 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 879 (2000) (holding that Elan School in
Maine was not least restrictive environment for student with emotional disabilities).
72. See john-Thor Dahlburg, Troubled Times for 'Tough Love', L.A. Times A1 (July 13, 2003)
(available at <http:/ /pqasb.pqarchiver.corn/latirnes/358107151.htrnl?did=358107151 &FMT=ABS&
FMTS= FT&date= j ul + 13, + 2003&desc=Troubled+Tirnes+ for+%2 7Tough+ Love%27%3b+ A+group+o
f+schools+for+wayward+youth+touts+its+successes,+but+sorne+parents+allege+abuse,+and+sorne
+facilities+have+been+shut+down. > (accessed Mar. 4, 2004)) (discussing allegations of abusive
discipline and filthy living conditions in behavior-modification programs operated by World Wide
Association of Specialty Programs and Schools in jamaica, Mexico, the Czech Republic, and Costa
Rica); Tim Weiner, Parents, Shopping for Discipline, Turn to Harsh Programs Abroad, N.Y. Times AI
(May 9, 2003) (discussing problems with behavior-modification programs run by the Utah-based
World Wide Association of Specialty Programs and Schools in the Czech Republic, Mexico, Costa
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E. School Responsibility

Remember that drug addiction itself is not a disabling condition
under IDEA, and therefore, if psychiatric treatment is required solely to
treat the child's addiction, and is not required to provide FAPE, the
school is not required to provide the treatment or to provide it at no
cost. 73 In short, IDEA "is not a panacea for all of life's ills," 71 and school
officials cannot be held responsible under the Act for failing to remedy
"adolescence. " 75

Rica, jamaica, Samoa, Montana, New York, and South Carolina).
73. Letter to Woodson, 213 !DELR 224 (OSEP 1989).
74. Maricus W. v. Lanett City Bd. of Educ., 141 F. Supp. 2d !OM, 1069 (M.D. Ala. 20(lJ ).
75. Socorro Indcp. Sch. Dist. v. Angelic Y, 107 F. Supp. 2d 761,767 n. X (W.IJ. Tex. 2000).

